

25X1

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000200130003-9

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
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1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
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ISSEM BY **48** PER **#**

SECRET 030534Z MAR 68 CITE SAIGON 9460

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT

3 MAR 68 IN 62464

REF: DIRECTOR 79549 *

1. REF DOES INDEED POSE TALL ORDER. HERewith INTERIM REPLY, WITH FULL RESPONSE FOLLOWING TO MEET WEDNESDAY DEADLINE.

2. WE MUST CAREFULLY SORT OUT THOSE MEASURES AND TASKS NEEDED TO MEET IMMEDIATE CRISIS FROM THOSE RELATED TO SOLVING LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS. WHILE SOME OF FORMER CAN AND SHOULD BE PLACED IN CONTEXT OF LATTER, WE CANNOT NOW, IN FACE OF CONTINUING ENEMY GENERAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL OFFENSIVE, SEEK TO RIGHT ALL THE WRONGS OF THIS GOVERNMENT AND OF OUR WAR EFFORT.

3. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND ALL WE HAVE COME TO KNOW IN LESS CRITICAL SITUATIONS OF INHERENT SLUGGISHNESS AND WEAKNESSES OF THIS GOVERNMENT. WE MUST REMEMBER THIS CRISIS CONFRONTS GVN AT TIME WHEN IT HAD MADE ONLY FIRST BASIC STEPS TOWARD EVOLVING ENTIRELY NEW -- AND FOREIGN -- UNTESTED GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM, IN WHICH DIVISIONS OF LABOR AND POWER BETWEEN ITS COMPONENT INSTITUTIONS NOT YET FULLY DEFINED. WE KNOW GVN IN NORMAL TIMES HAS BEEN ABLE ONLY MARGINALLY TO COPE WITH PLETHORA OF PROGRAMS IM-

DDI/DCI/ONE/OPR - added to distribution per GAC 4 Mar 68

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SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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LOST TO ENEMY. MANY ARE, HOWEVER, BEING SUBJECTED TO REPEATED HARASSMENT OR ARE THREATENED WITH IMMINENT GROUND ATTACK. ARVN'S PERFORMANCE HAS VARIED WIDELY, BUT CAN BE SAID TO HAVE IMPROVED SLIGHTLY IN THE ~~THE INCREASING NUMBERS OF SECRET OPERATIONS FOR~~ ~~4,468,2,7,364,2,2330,9334,562,733,8~~ ~~ADAPTED TO PUSH ENEMY BACK FROM CITIES AND TOWNS~~ ~~37,535,55,974,3,3,6,1,2,149,3583,5,592,~~ LITTLE CAN BE DONE THAT IS NOT BEING DONE TO IMPROVE IMMEDIATELY THEIR PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ADVISORY EXHORTATIONS AND PROVISION OF TIME-LY AND ADEQUATE U.S. TACTICAL SUPPORT. COORDINATION BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND ARVN TACTICAL COMMANDS COULD BE IMPROVED IN SOME AREAS THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBINED OPERATIONS CENTERS OR COMBINED TACTICAL COMMANDS, BUT THIS IS PROBLEM FOR THE MILITARY AND MUST BE TACKLED IN A MANNER WHICH IMPROVES, RATHER THAN DISRUPTS, EXISTING COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

6. AT NATIONAL LEVEL, THERE ARE SIGNS GVN IS RECOVERING FROM INITIAL SHOCK AND BEGINNING MOVE ADEQUATELY TO COPE WITH CRISIS. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS BEGUN EXERT LEADERSHIP IN PAST WEEK, RESPONDING TO URGINGS FROM MANY QUARTERS. CHANGES IN CORPS COMMANDERS, HIS PRESIDING AT RELIEF COMMITTEE, AND HIS HARNESSING OF GENERAL KY BY CHARGING HIM WITH SURVEY OF PACIFICATION EFFORT ARE ALL ENCOURAGING STEPS IN RIGHT DIRECTION. WHETHER THEY WILL

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ACCELERATE WILL DEPEND ON CONTINUED EXHORTATION, AND EXTENT TO WHICH THIEU GAINS CONFIDENCE AS TIME GOES ON. WE WOULD ASSESS THIS AS AT LEAST MARGINAL PERFORMANCE. AT OTHER LEVELS, WE SEE HOPE FOR PREVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE IN IV CORPS TO IMPROVE TO ADEQUATE WITH ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL THANG. OTHER CORPS COMMANDS ARE MARGINAL OR ADEQUATE, GIVEN LOCAL MILITARY CONDITIONS. AT PROVINCE LEVEL, PERFORMANCE VARIES, WITH U.S. ADVISORY ELEMENTS IN MANY AREAS COMPENSATING ADEQUATELY FOR OCCASIONAL LESS THAN SATISFACTORY GVN PERFORMANCE. SAME IS PROBABLY TRUE AT DISTRICT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL LITTLE INFORMATION FROM THAT LEVEL.

7. GVN IS COPING MORE OR LESS ADEQUATELY WITH RELIEF PROGRAM, WITH MOVEMENT TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION STAGE PROCEEDING IN SEVERAL AREAS.

8. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE RAPID AND DEMONSTRABLY EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO RALLY POPULAR SUPPORT AND RESTORE CONFIDENCE, WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT WHETHER VIETNAMESE ARE REALLY CAPABLE OF GOING MUCH FASTER THAN THEY ARE. GIVEN EXISTING RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS, TRADITIONAL CYNICISM, AND UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR CAUSED BY TET OFFENSIVE, WE WOULD ASSESS GVN EFFORTS IN THIS SPHERE AS MARGINAL. MISSION IS SEEKING TO STIMULATE

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FURTHER ACTIVITY AT NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS, AND IS PUSHING REGENERATE VIS TO MORE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN INFORMATION AND COUNTER PROPAGANDA FIELDS. IN THIS INSTANCE, AS IN OTHERS, FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO HOLD THINGS TOGETHER, WITH SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS DESIGNED TO EXTEND BEYOND THAT MINIMUM INITIAL GOAL.

9. WITH RESPECT TO PACIFICATION, RESULTS HAVE BEEN MARGINAL IN TERMS OF PUSHING ASSETS BACK OUT INTO FIELD. WHILE WE WANT TO AVOID PURELY DEFENSIVE APPROACH AT THIS TIME, AND ARE URGING NEED TO PUSH ENEMY BACK FROM CITIES AND REASSERTING GVN CONTROL IN FORMER PACIFICATION AREAS, FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO PROTECTING TOWNS AND CITIES. ALL MISSION COMPONENTS ARE PUSHING LINE THAT BEST DEFENSE IS GOOD OFFENSE, WITH SOME RESPONSE IN SOME AREAS. ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL KY TO MISSION OF SURVEYING PROBLEM AND MAKING APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS IS ENCOURAGING STEP FORWARD.

10. IN SUM, DURING SHORT TERM MISSION MUST USE ALL POSSIBLE LEVERAGE TO IMPROVE GVN PERFORMANCE IN THESE AREAS. WE MUST AVOID PUSHING SOLUTIONS THAT REQUIRE DRASTIC REORGANIZATION OR REORIENTATION OF RESOURCES SINCE THESE WILL RESULT IN LOST TIME AND DISRUPTION OF ONGOING ACTIVITIES. GIVEN THIS CAVEAT STATION CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT GVN PERFORMANCE IN THESE AREAS WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *Lists a number of points that Hqs. needs Station's analysis and assessment on to support [redacted] 1) participation in a high level review and decision making process currently in train.

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